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Background: Given the evidence that reasoning biases 
contribute to delusional persistence and change, several 
research groups have made systematic efforts to modify 
them. The current experiment tested the hypothesis that 
targeting reasoning biases would result in change in delu-
sions. Methods: One hundred and one participants with 
current delusions and schizophrenia spectrum psychosis 
were randomly allocated to a brief computerized reason-
ing training intervention or to a control condition involving 
computer-based activities of similar duration. The pri-
mary hypotheses tested were that the reasoning training 
intervention, would improve (1) data gathering and belief 
flexibility and (2) delusional thinking, specifically para-
noia. We then tested whether the changes in paranoia were 
mediated by changes in data gathering and flexibility, and 
whether working memory and negative symptoms moder-
ated any intervention effects. Results: On an intention-to-
treat analysis, there were significant improvements in state 
paranoia and reasoning in the experimental compared with 
the control condition. There was evidence that changes in 
reasoning mediated changes in paranoia, although this 
effect fell just outside the conventional level of signifi-
cance after adjustment for baseline confounders. Working 
memory and negative symptoms significantly moderated 
the effects of the intervention on reasoning. Conclusion: 
The study demonstrated the effectiveness of a brief rea-
soning intervention in improving both reasoning processes 
and paranoia. It thereby provides proof-of-concept evi-
dence that reasoning is a promising intermediary target 
in interventions to ameliorate delusions, and thus supports 
the value of developing this approach as a longer therapeu-
tic intervention.
Key words: jumping to conclusions/belief  flexibility/ 
mediators/reasoning biases/psychosis
Introduction
Two strands of research form the background to this 
study: first, the development and evaluation of cognitive 
behavioral therapy (CBT) for psychosis and secondly, 
hypotheses about causal mechanisms of delusion forma-
tion derived from cognitive models of psychosis. There is 
good evidence for the effectiveness of CBT for psychosis, 
summarized in meta-analyses.1–4 These are consistent in 
finding that CBT improves a range of outcomes, including 
positive symptoms of psychosis, with a small effect size 
of around 0.2–0.4. However, the modest effects of CBT 
in meta-analyses indicate a need to improve CBT.5 Recent 
research has also substantially increased our knowledge 
of cognitive processes likely to contribute to persistence 
and change in delusions.6 However, we have little evidence 
so far that CBT for psychosis does change the cognitive 
processes hypothesized to maintain delusions. It has 
been suggested that in order to achieve improvements in 
therapy, we must increase our understanding of cognitive 
mechanisms of symptom change.7,8 Manipulations spe-
cifically designed to target theoretically derived processes 
should provide the basis for developing new, more effec-
tive methods of intervention, an approach used success-
fully to improve treatments in emotional disorders (eg, 
Clark et al9) and hallucinations.10,11
Cognitive models of delusions propose that their devel-
opment and persistence is shaped by both emotional and 
reasoning processes.6,12 It is held that reasoning biases 
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distort the appraisal of disturbing anomalous experiences 
and adverse events: in particular, limited data gathering 
leads to a rapid acceptance of implausible ideas without 
consideration of alternative explanations (AE).12–15 The 
current study concerns 2 reasoning biases prominent in 
people with delusions: (1) a tendency to gather less data 
than controls to reach a decision, the “jumping to con-
clusions” bias (JTC); and (2) limitations in belief  flexibil-
ity, ie, in the “metacognitive process of thinking about 
one’s own delusional beliefs, changing them in the light 
of reflection and evidence and generating and consider-
ing alternatives.”6,16 Poor belief  flexibility is common in 
people with delusions, and is related to, but distinct from, 
delusional conviction and JTC. Even people with maxi-
mal conviction delusions are found to differ in belief  flex-
ibility; in one study, one quarter of 110 people expressing 
100% delusional conviction concurrently responded 
that they might be mistaken: thus people can be equally 
convinced that they are correct in asserting a belief  but 
differ in their relationship to that conviction.17 JTC and 
belief  flexibility do not appear to be changed by antipsy-
chotic medication17,18 but there is emerging evidence that 
both phenomena may moderate the response to antipsy-
chotic and psychological treatments: people with a JTC 
bias or limited belief  flexibility show a poorer treatment 
response.17,19–22 Changes in delusions are also associated 
with changes in data gathering on a JTC task.23,24
Given the potential importance of these reasoning 
biases in delusion change and persistence, several groups 
have made systematic attempts to modify them.25–27 Moritz 
and colleagues,28 have pioneered “metacognitive training” 
(MCT) for a range of social-cognitive biases, found in 
psychosis, including JTC. They obtained improvements 
in delusions in a large randomized controlled trial (RCT), 
using group training with a broadly defined clinical pop-
ulation, with past or current delusions whose severity 
was rated as low-moderate.29 However, another RCT of 
group-based MCT with more severe delusions recently 
found no effect, either on delusions or reasoning pro-
cesses.30 Furthermore in Moritz et al’s study, those in the 
MCT condition did not experience significantly greater 
improvements in reasoning than controls receiving cogni-
tive remediation training.
We have developed a brief  computerized reason-
ing training program (the Maudsley Review Training 
Program), building on Moritz’s development of MCT. 
However, our program differs in that it targets JTC and 
belief  flexibility more intensively, incorporates material 
intended to be personally relevant and salient, and is 
delivered individually rather than in a group format. In 2 
pilot studies, data gathering was improved in people with 
current delusions.31,32 In one, delusional conviction also 
significantly declined: this employed more delusion-rele-
vant (paranoia) training materials, with a stronger focus 
on enhancing belief  flexibility.32 Although encouraging, 
no randomized controlled study has yet convincingly 
demonstrated that change in reasoning processes as a 
result of a reasoning intervention accompanies and medi-
ates improvements in delusion outcomes.
Factors affecting the course of psychosis include neu-
rocognitive deficits, particularly working memory and 
attention. These are related to negative symptoms, poorer 
functioning, and worse overall outcomes.33 An associa-
tion between JTC and working memory deficits has been 
demonstrated34–36 and, recently, it has been found that 
JTC is linked to negative symptoms.36 It is therefore plau-
sible that impaired working memory and negative symp-
toms might both negatively moderate the effect of the 
reasoning intervention on the targeted mediators (rea-
soning processes) and outcomes.
Study Aim, Design, and Hypotheses
The current study tested the hypothesis that targeting 
reasoning biases would result in change in delusions. 
The study was not a test of therapy delivered at a level 
of intensity or dose intended to achieve clinically impor-
tant long-term change; rather, it employed an experimen-
tal reasoning intervention in order to achieve short-term 
change in delusional state, investigating hypothesized 
relationships between these variables to establish proof-
of-concept. In addition to investigating mechanisms of 
change, we also wished to examine hypothesized modera-
tors of outcomes.
Participants were randomly allocated to a comput-
erized reasoning training intervention or to a control 
condition involving computer-based activities of simi-
lar duration. The primary hypotheses tested were that a 
reasoning training intervention targeting the JTC reason-
ing bias and belief  flexibility, compared with the control 
condition, would:
1. Improve data gathering and belief  flexibility (hypoth-
esized mediators); and
2. Show improvements in state levels of delusional think-
ing, specifically state paranoia (outcome);
As secondary analyses, we examined:
3. Whether improvement in delusional outcomes would 
be mediated by changes in JTC and belief  flexibility
4. Whether baseline (preintervention) levels of working 
memory, negative symptoms, and baseline reasoning 
biases (JTC and belief  flexibility) would negatively 
moderate response to the intervention.
Methods
Participants
We recruited 101 individuals with current delu-
sions and a schizophrenia spectrum disorder from 6 
National Health Service (NHS) mental health services 
in London and Norfolk, UK. The inclusion criteria 
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were: a diagnosis of schizophrenia spectrum disorder 
(International Classification of Diseases-10, F20-29); a 
current delusional belief  consistently held over 3 months 
with at least 50% self-rated conviction, and rated as dis-
tressing (>0 on a Visual Analog Scale of distress); aged 
18–65  years; and fluent in English. Individuals were 
excluded if  they had a primary diagnosis of alcohol or 
substance dependence, organic syndrome or learning dis-
ability, or profound visual impairment. They were also 
excluded if  currently undertaking a course of psychologi-
cal therapy focused on delusions. The current study was 
1 of 2 separate but linked studies, employing randomized 
experimental designs to test hypothesized mechanisms of 
change in delusions, using common measures but sepa-
rate patient samples (Freeman et al, submitted).
Procedure
The research had been reviewed by an NHS research 
ethics committee, and all participants provided written 
informed consent. Assessments were carried out at 4 
points. Baseline assessments for the purposes of clinical, 
diagnostic, and demographic description, and of assess-
ing potential moderators, took approximately 3 h and 
were completed over at least 2 meetings, depending on 
the pace participants found comfortable. Following com-
pletion of baseline assessments, randomization was car-
ried out, using an independent dedicated randomization 
service. The premanipulation and first postmanipulation 
assessments each took an hour, being completed before 
and after the experimental manipulation. A second post-
manipulation assessment was completed after a home-
work interval, 2 weeks after the first post assessment.
Experimental and Control Interventions
Those allocated to the experimental manipulation com-
pleted the Maudsley Review Training Program together 
with a researcher (see Waller et al32 for a detailed descrip-
tion). This brief  interactive computerized intervention 
aims to provide education on reasoning biases (belief  
inflexibility and JTC), as well as teaching a number of 
strategies aimed at reducing these biases. It comprises 
an educational introduction, then 5 tasks, aimed both 
at enhancing self-awareness of biases, and also train-
ing the key strategies: looking for more evidence and 
thinking carefully before reaching a definite conclusion; 
being aware of the impact that mood and past experi-
ences have on our thinking; and generating alternative, 
less distressing, explanations for events. One of the tasks 
(picture completion), which encourages data gathering, 
was adapted from the metacognitive training package 
of Moritz et  al.28 The other 4 tasks were all developed 
especially for the program. Three of the tasks include 
materials designed to trigger paranoid thinking styles, 
in order to elicit “hot cognitions” and to teach strategies 
likely to generalize to participants’ own experiences and 
paranoid beliefs. All tasks were designed to be interactive 
and engaging and included simple puzzles, video record-
ings, and short film clips. Throughout the program, the 
researcher (a psychology graduate) checked on partici-
pants’ understanding, provided further clarification if  
needed, and prompted discussion of ideas, especially 
when relating aspects of the program to participants’ own 
experiences. Overall, the training lasted 1.5–3 h, depend-
ing on the amount of discussion and took place over 3 
meetings, which included the premanipulation and first 
postmanipulation assessments. The experimental train-
ing also included homework exercises, with a specially 
designed booklet, supported by 2 researcher-initiated 
telephone calls, over the 2 weeks between the first and sec-
ond post manipulation assessments (post 1 and post 2).
The control manipulation was chosen to control for 
similar activity and attentional task requirements, while 
being inactive with respect to the targeted reasoning 
processes. It comprised 3 interactive computer tasks, 
based on information processing paradigms, designed 
to take approximately the same time as the experimen-
tal training. If  participants completed these too quickly, 
2 neutral video clips could be shown. The tasks were: 
McCollough visual after-effects, involving looking 
at a black and white grid, then rating the visual effect 
obtained in a range of  positions37; Kamin blocking – the 
“Film Stars” task of  Jones et  al38; and a latent inhibi-
tion task, based on that of  Young et al.39 The Control 
manipulation typically lasted 1.5 h and was completed 
over 3 meetings, which again included the pre and post 
1 assessments. Participants in the control condition also 
received 2 phone calls in the 2 weeks after the first post 
manipulation assessment, to check how they were, and 
how they were finding participation, and to remind them 
to attend the final (post 2) assessment meeting.
Measures
Symptom Measures (Baseline Assessments). Psychotic 
symptoms: The Scale for the Assessment of Positive 
Symptoms and the Scale for the Assessment of Negative 
Symptoms (SAPS and SANS).40,41 The SAPS and SANS 
are widely used and well-validated semistructured inter-
views designed to assess the presence over the past 
month of positive and negative symptoms associated 
with schizophrenia. The SAPS covers 35 items, while the 
SANS covers 25. Both have good psychometric proper-
ties. For the current study, the SAPS was used to charac-
terize the delusion subtypes. The ratings were summed to 
create total scores for the SANS and the SAPS.
Depression and anxiety:  Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI-II)42 and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI).43 The 
BDI-II is a 21-item self-report instrument for assessing 
symptoms of depression occurring over the past 2 weeks 
on a 4-point scale (0–3). The BAI includes 21 items rated 
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on the same 4-point scale, but is assessed over the previ-
ous week.
Neurocognitive Measures (Completed at Baseline).  
Neuropsychological tests: Wechsler Test of Adult Reading 
(WTAR)44 and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) 
III subtest: Digit Span.45
Premorbid IQ was estimated using the WTAR, which 
comprises pronouncing 50 irregularly spelled words. 
Working memory was assessed by the Digit Span subtest 
of WAIS III: participants are first read a series of num-
bers and asked to repeat them in the correct order; the 
series increases progressively in length until the partici-
pant fails. This is then repeated with a different series of 
numbers, but this time the participant is asked to give the 
numbers in reverse order. The scores are the series lengths 
correctly recalled forward, backward, and totaled.
State Paranoia Measure (Completed Pre- and 
Postintervention). We constructed a latent state para-
noia variable from 7 measures tapping state paranoia: We 
used 6 Visual Analog Scale items assessing ideas of per-
secution and reference taken from Green et al’s Paranoid 
Thought Scales46: I  am being deliberately harmed or 
upset, there is a conspiracy against me, I am being fol-
lowed, I am being persecuted, I am feeling under threat 
from others, and I am being laughed at behind my back. 
These items were selected as having both high loadings 
on the persecution or reference subscales and also as 
representative of a range of key paranoid concerns; they 
have good internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .86).47 
For each item, participants rated how they were feeling 
“right now” from 0 (not at all) to 100 (totally). Finally 
a seventh item assessed delusional conviction on a self-
rated scale of 0–100. Factor loadings for state paranoia 
were estimated for a standardized latent factor at the pre-
manipulation assessment, and then used to calculate the 
factor scores at the 2 postmanipulation assessments.
Reasoning Measures (Completed Pre- and Postintervention).  
Reasoning: JTC–probabilistic reasoning task.16 Two com-
puterized versions of the probabilistic reasoning (Beads) 
task, with 85:15 (easy) and 60:40 (difficult) task ratios, 
were used. For example, for the easy version, one jar had 
85 orange beads and 15 black beads, while the other had 
15 orange beads and 85 black beads. Participants were 
shown the 2 jars, and told that one of the jars would be 
selected at random by the computer and that beads would 
be drawn from and replaced in the selected jar. After each 
bead was drawn, participants were asked if  they would 
like to see more beads (ie, if  they would like more informa-
tion) or if  they could say, with certainty, from which of the 
jars the beads were being drawn. Once a bead had been 
drawn, it was shown at the bottom of the screen, thereby 
providing a memory aid. The key variable was the num-
ber of beads requested by the participant before making 
a decision. We report both the mean number of beads 
drawn and a dichotomous variable (Yes/No), where Yes 
was classified as requesting 2 or fewer beads.
Belief  flexibility: Maudsley Assessment of Delusions 
Scale (MADS)48 and the Explanations of Experiences 
(EoE) measure.49 Two MADS items were used to measure 
aspects of belief  flexibility (the possibility of being mis-
taken [PM], and the reaction to hypothetical contradic-
tion). The evidence for the delusion cited by participants 
is sensitively discussed, and they are asked whether it is 
at all possible for them to be mistaken about their delu-
sional belief. The interviewer then asks how they would 
react in a hypothetical situation if  some new evidence 
were to contradict the grounds for the delusion. If  they 
report that this would alter their level of belief  in any way, 
this is recorded as belief  flexibility. The EoE measure is a 
structured interview designed to assess whether people 
can envisage AE for the evidence cited for their delusion. 
Once the evidence for the delusion is established, they are 
asked “Can you think of any other explanations for the 
experiences that you have described? Are there any other 
reasons — other than [the delusional belief] — that could 
possibly account for these experiences even if  you think 
they are very unlikely?” The generation of any AE is also 
taken as a measure of belief  flexibility. All 3 belief  flex-
ibility measures are rated as present or absent, but the 
possibility of being mistaken is also scored on a scale of 
0–100 (from “not at all” to “totally”).32 In a factor anal-
ysis of a sample of 300 people with psychosis, these 3 
measures formed a coherent and stable belief  flexibility 
factor.17
Other State Symptom Measures (Completed Pre- and 
Postintervention). Hallucinations Visual Analog Scales: 
Participants reporting any experience of hallucinations 
were asked to state the main, or most distressing expe-
rience and rated its frequency and distress “right now,” 
from 0 (not at all) to 100 (totally). Anxiety and Depression 
Visual Analog Scales: Participants were asked to rate how 
“anxious” and how “depressed” they were feeling “right 
now,” from 0 (not at all) to 100 (totally).
Analysis
All analyses were carried out using Stata version 13.1.50 
In a conventional intention-to-treat (ITT) approach, 
ANCOVA was used to evaluate the effect of the ran-
domization condition on the outcome (paranoia) and, 
separately, the putative mediators (JTC and belief  flex-
ibility) as dependent variables. We allowed for center 
and the baseline measures as covariates in these models. 
Mediation analysis was performed using the methods 
of Baron and Kenny51 and as extended in Valeri and 
Vanderweele,52 to investigate direct and indirect effects 
of the experimental manipulation on paranoia. In addi-
tion to the previous ITT models, this involved regressing 
404
P. Garety et al
paranoia on the randomized condition and the separate 
mediators in a linear model. The effect of randomized 
condition on the mediator and the effect of the mediator 
on paranoia are multiplied to estimate the indirect effect. 
Since a variable can only be a mediator if  there is a sig-
nificant effect of randomized condition on the mediator, 
mediation analysis was only performed when there was 
a significant ITT effect on the mediators. We performed 
the mediation analysis with and without adjustment for 
baseline covariates in all 3 models. Estimates of the direct 
and indirect effects can be biased, even in randomized tri-
als, when there are unmeasured confounders between the 
mediator and outcome.53 By including baseline measures 
of the outcome and mediators in the regression models, 
we attempt to control for these as potential confounders 
in order to add robustness to our analysis. Finally, we 
tested whether any of the ITT effects might be subject 
to moderation by baseline (prerandomization) covariates 
by including interactions between the baseline covariates 
and randomization in the models. The results presented 
here are of complete cases, so that patients with miss-
ing outcomes or mediator values are not included in the 
analysis; we indicate the numbers included in our results. 
This approach assumes that, conditional on the baseline 
covariates and randomization, the missing outcomes and 
mediators are missing at random.
Results
Participants: Demographic, Clinical, and 
Neurocognitive Data
The study was powered for the primary outcome on a 
sample of 100 participants; we recruited to this target, and 
the final sample comprised 101 participants. Of these, 61 
were male and 40 female. Their mean age was 41.6 years 
(SD = 11.0) and they had been diagnosed for 14.7 years 
(SD = 9.9). Sixty two (61%) were recorded as of white eth-
nicity, while 24 (24%) were black (African or Caribbean), 
and the remaining 15 (15%) Asian or other. Diagnoses 
were derived using OPCRIT from SCAN interviews 
(Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry)54 
and were as follows: schizophrenia 89 (88%); delusional 
disorder 3 (3%); schizoaffective disorder 6 (6%); and 
other nonorganic psychotic disorders 3 (3%). The par-
ticipants were nearly all currently taking antipsychotic 
medication (94 of 101). All completed the SAPS and 
all had delusions of at least moderate (score 3) severity, 
with high levels of delusional conviction: 50% reported 
100% conviction and 80% of the total sample reported 
conviction at 75% and above. Eighty-eight percent had at 
least one delusion that was persecutory in content, while 
the remainder all had delusions with content related to 
persecutory concerns, mainly in the context of ideas of 
reference. The other delusion types recorded, most fre-
quently co-occurring with persecutory delusions, were: 
69 Reference, 51 Mind being read, 26 Thought Insertion, 
23 Thought Broadcast, 20 Being controlled, 20 Religious, 
17 Somatic, 13 Grandiose, 9 Thought withdrawal, and 
8 Guilt. Participants had moderate levels of depression 
(BDI mean 22.1; SD = 12.4) and of anxiety (BAI mean 
24.9; SD = 13.0).
Table  1 shows summary statistics, for each random-
ized group, for the baseline neurocognitive and negative 
symptom measures, that were hypothesized to be mod-
erators of effects. The SAPS (positive symptoms) scores 
are also shown.
Outcome and Reasoning (Mediators) Summary Data
Table  2 shows summary statistics at each time point 
for the state paranoia outcome measure, and the rea-
soning variables, for each randomized group sepa-
rately. Four participants dropped out of  the study 
between baseline and the start of  the intervention and 
a further 4 dropped out over the course of  the 2-week 
intervention period (from pre- to post 2), 2 from each 
condition.
Primary ITT Analysis
Table  3 shows the ITT effects (the differences between 
the groups) on state paranoia, and on the hypothesized 
mediators, at each time point separately and after adjust-
ment for baseline values of the measure and center. 
Table 1. Summary Baseline Values of Neurocognitive and Symptom Scores
Measure
Experimental Group Control Group
Mean SD Range N Mean SD Range N
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading 87.09 18.37 53–124 47 90.45 19.16 50–120 49
Digit span (raw total) 15.47 4.74 8–27 51 15.48 3.90 7–23 50
Digit span (forward) 9.78 2.86 5–16 51 9.88 2.55 6–14 50
Digit span (backward) 5.69 2.24 2–11 51 5.60 2.01 1–10 50
Negative symptoms (SANS total) 9.68 3.68 3–18 50 10.31 3.99 2–18 49
Positive symptoms (SAPS total) 8.82 2.73 4–15 51 9.1 2.57 4–15 50
Note: SANS, Scale for the Assessment of Negative Symptoms; SAPS, Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms.
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The  primary end point for the paranoia outcome is at 
post 2, after the homework exercises had been completed. 
There was a significant effect on paranoia, with the inter-
vention group showing a reduction (improvement) com-
pared with the control group at post 2, with an effect 
size of −0.36. Both time points—immediately after the 
training and after the homework period—are of interest 
for the investigation of effects on mediators. There were 
significant effects (improved data gathering and more 
flexibility in reasoning, greater in the intervention than 
the control) mainly at post 2 on both the beads tasks 
and 2 on the belief  flexibility measures (PM and AE). 
The effect size on the number of beads 85/15 was 0.31 at 
post 1, while that for 60/40 was 0.31 at post 1, and 0.40 at 
post 2. The effect size for probability of being mistaken 
at post 2 was 0.35. There were no significant effects of the 
Table 2. Summary Outcome (Paranoia) and Hypothesized Reasoning (Mediators) Data
Measure Time
Experimental Group Control Group
Mean SD Range N Mean SD Range N
Outcome
State paranoia factor Pre −0.13 0.84 −1.1, 2.3 50 0.10 0.99 −1.2, 2.3 46
Post 1 −0.11 0.98 −1.1, 2.1 47 0.10 1.02 −1.1, 2.1 43
Post 2 −0.23 0.77 −1.1, 1.9 47 0.22 1.03 −1.1, 2.2 45
Mediator
Possibility of being mistaken, % Pre 18.0 26.2 0–100 50 18.9 26.5 0–100 46
Post 1 23.4 29.1 0–100 48 19.4 28.0 0–100 47
Post 2 24.8 28.5 0–90 48 15.5 22.7 0–90 44
Number of beads—85/15 Pre 4.5 4.5 1–20 50 4.1 3.6 1–19 47
Post 1 6.3 5.1 1–20 48 4.0 3.7 1–20 47
Post 2 7.0 5.9 1–20 48 5.5 5.3 1–20 45
Number of beads—60/40 Pre 7.1 6.0 1–20 50 7.0 5.1 1–20 47
Post 1 8.6 5.8 1–20 48 6.9 5.2 1–20 47
Post 2 9.0 6.4 1–20 48 6.8 4.6 1–18 45
N % N %
JTC 85:15 Pre No 34 68.0 28 59.6
Yes 16 32.0 19 40.4
Post 1 No 39 81.3 25 53.2
Yes 9 19.7 22 46.8
Post 2 No 37 77.1 31 68.9
Yes 11 22.9 14 31.1
JTC 60:40 Pre No 34 68.0 35 74.5
Yes 16 32.0 12 25.5
Post 1 No 41 85.4 36 76.6
Yes 7 14.6 11 23.4
Post 2 No 37 77.1 36 80.0
Yes 11 22.9 9 20.0
Possibility of being mistaken, Y/N Pre No 26 52.0 29 61.7
Yes 24 48.0 18 38.3
Post 1 No 23 47.9 25 53.2
Yes 25 52.1 22 46.8
Post 2 No 15 31.3 25 56.8
Yes 33 68.7 19 43.2
Alternative explanations Pre No 39 78.0 37 78.7
Yes 11 22.0 10 21.3
Post 1 No 33 68.8 36 76.6
Yes 15 31.2 11 23.4
Post 2 No 27 56.3 33 73.3
Yes 21 43.7 12 26.7
Hypothetical contradiction Pre No 34 69.4 35 74.5
Yes 15 30.6 12 25.5
Post No 31 64.6 33 70.2
Yes 17 35.4 14 29.8
Post 2 No 30 62.5 28 63.6
Yes 18 37.5 16 36.4
Note: JTC, jumping to conclusions.
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intervention at either time point on hallucinations, anxi-
ety, or depression.
Mediation Analysis
We employed the state paranoia factor at post 2 as the 
outcome for the mediation analysis, using only those 
measures significant at either time point as mediators 
(table 3: for this purpose, P < .1). The analyses present 
results with and without adjustment for the pretest values 
for paranoia and all the putative mediators, together with 
recruitment center, as covariates (table 4). In the adjusted 
analysis, there was evidence of partial mediation for the 
reduction in paranoia by belief  flexibility (approximately 
40% for PM, as a dichotomous variable) and, to a lesser 
extent (21%), for AE. The evidence of mediation by belief  
flexibility (PM) fell just outside the conventional level of 
significance (P = .057). In the unadjusted analysis, we 
Table 3. Effect of Experimental Group Compared With Control Group on Outcome and Mediator Measures
Measure Time Effect SE P Value 95% CI N
Outcome
State paranoia factor Post 1 −0.00 0.13 .985 −0.26, 0.26 90
Post 2 −0.36 0.16 .028 −0.67, −0.04 92
Mediators
 Beads—85/15 Post 1 1.97 0.73 .008 0.52, 3.43 95
Post 2 1.17 1.03 .262 −0.89, 3.22 93
 Beads—60/40 Post 1 1.68 0.82 .045 0.04, 3.32 95
Post 2 1.86 0.87 .035 0.13, 3.59 93
 Possibility of being mistaken, yes/no Post 1 OR = 1.09 0.52 .850 0.43, 2.79 95
Post 2 OR = 4.10 2.28 .011 1.38, 12.17 92
 Alternative explanations Post 1 OR = 2.24 1.48 .222 0.62, 8.17 95
Post 2 OR = 2.90 1.58 .051 1.00, 8.45 93
 Possibility of being mistaken, % Post 1 4.02 5.16 .438 −6.23, 14.28 94
Post 2 9.71 5.01 .056 −0.25, 19.68 94
 Hypothetical contradiction Post 1 OR = 1.28 0.65 .621 0.48, 3.44 95
Post 2 OR = 0.96 0.51 .937 0.34, 2.71 92
Other symptom states
 Hallucination frequency–VAS Post 1 −4.80 19.34 .805 −43.53, 33.94 63
Post 2 −10.85 20.54 .600 −52.02, 30.32 61
 Hallucination Distress–VAS Post 1 −8.01 6.30 .209 −20.62, 4.60 64
Post 2 2.95 5.90 .619 −14.77, 8.87 62
 Anxiety–VAS Post 1 −0.47 5.05 .927 −10.51, 9.58 93
Post 2 −1.00 6.29 .874 −13.50, 11.50 93
 Depression–VAS Post 1 1.48 5.41 .785 −9.27, 12.24 93
Post 2 3.13 5.92 .599 −8.64, 14.89 93
Note: VAS, Visual Analog Scale.
Table 4. Statistical Mediation Analysis for State Paranoia Within Each Mediator, the Top Row Shows the Adjusted Analysis, the Bottom 
Row Shows the Unadjusted Analysis
Mediator
Total Effect, Effect  
(SE), P Value
Direct Effect, Effect  
(SE), P Value
Mediated Effect, Effect  
(SE), P Value
Proportion 
Mediated, % N
Beads 85/15 at post 1 −0.35 (0.16), .027 −0.33 (0.16), .040 −0.02 (0.04), .591 5.7 94
−0.46 (0.19), .015 −0.39, (0.19), .042 −0.07 (0.06), .232 15.2 94
Beads 60/40 at post 1 −0.35 (0.16), .026 −0.36 (0.16), .027 0.00 (0.03), .889 0.0 94
−0.45 (0.19), .018 −0.42, (0.19), .030 −0.04 (0.04), .351 8.9 94
Beads 60/40 at post 2 −0.36 (0.16), .025 −0.33 (0.16), .041 −0.02 (0.04), .512 5.5 93
−0.46 (0.19), .016 −0.42, (0.19), .031 −0.04 (0.04), .331 8.7 93
PM % at post 2 −0.39 (0.16), .012 −0.34 (0.16), .031 −0.06 (0.04), .197 15.4 91
−0.46 (0.19), .016 −0.35, (0.18), .056 −0.11 (0.07), .126 23.9 91
PM—yes/no at post 2 −0.44 (0.20), .025 −0.27 (0.15), .077 −0.17 (0.08), .057 38.6 92
−0.47 (0.22), .029 −0.31 (0.19), .097 −0.16 (0.08), .042 34.0 92
AE—yes/no at post 2 −0.38 (0.21), .066 −0.30 (0.16), .060 −0.08 (0.06), .182 21.1 93
−0.45 (0.23), .056 −0.35 (0.18), .058 −0.10 (0.07), .130 22.2 93
Note: AE, alternative explanations; PM, possibility of being mistaken.
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found a significant indirect effect through belief  flexibil-
ity PM (P = .042). There was no evidence that changes in 
JTC mediated a reduction in paranoia.
Moderation Analysis
We considered whether the effect our intervention on the 
significant mediators and on the paranoia outcome was 
moderated by the following variables assessed at baseline: 
reasoning biases, premorbid IQ, working memory, and 
negative symptoms. There was no significant moderation 
of the mediators by any of the pretest (baseline) reason-
ing variables or by premorbid IQ. Thus, the intervention 
is effective in improving reasoning, regardless of pretest 
biases in data gathering (JTC), belief  flexibility, and levels 
of premorbid IQ.
The results of moderation by working memory and 
negative symptoms on the effects of the intervention on 
reasoning are given in table 5, based on P levels of <.1. 
Digit span (working memory) significantly moderated the 
effect of the intervention on JTC and on belief  flexibil-
ity (PM); when analyzed separately, this was significant 
for digit span forward but not backward. Better work-
ing memory enhanced the effects of the intervention on 
reasoning. Negative symptoms significantly moderated 
the effect of the intervention on PM (both expressed as 
percentage [P = .046], and, at trend level, when measured 
dichotomously, P = .070). The effect of the intervention 
in improving belief  flexibility was reduced as negative 
symptom scores increase. There was, however, no signifi-
cant moderation of the paranoia outcome by any of the 
hypothesized moderator variables.
Discussion
This study has a novel combination of features. It used 
an experimental design in a clinical population of people 
with distressing, strongly held delusions, it randomized 
between 2 conditions matched for duration and contact, 
and it has demonstrated the effectiveness of a brief  rea-
soning intervention in improving both reasoning pro-
cesses and paranoia. It thereby provides proof-of-concept 
evidence that reasoning is a promising intermediary tar-
get in interventions to ameliorate delusions, and thus 
supports the potential value of this approach.27,28,55
As assessed by most measures, the intervention, despite 
its brevity, significantly affected reasoning, our putative 
mediator. The effects on data gathering were seen imme-
diately after training, while belief  flexibility only changed 
significantly after the 2-week homework exercises and 
generalization. The intervention also significantly 
affected the targeted outcome of paranoia. This effect 
occurred, as expected, after the period of homework 
exercises. We knew that training on its own would be 
insufficient. We actively encouraged (though did not for-
mally monitor) homework completion in 2 phone calls. 
Accordingly throughout the intervention, we emphasized 
to participants the need to generalize the learning from 
the training to real life situations. The focus in both train-
ing and homework exercises was on exploring how people 
come to decisions and make sense of their everyday expe-
riences. We tried to encourage awareness of reasoning 
processes in participants and to help them identify and, 
where appropriate, inhibit rapid, automatic reasoning 
(“type one” reasoning) and engage in more analytical or 
controlled reasoning (“type two”).56–58
Training also aimed to help participants consider the 
role of their emotions in thinking processes and to engage 
“hot cognitions” in order to develop the ability to enlist 
more reflective analytic reasoning processes under these 
everyday conditions. This is as recommended by van 
Oosterhout et  al,30 who also comment on the potential 
limitations of a group educational approach of metacog-
nitive training and the importance of arousing personal 
emotional meanings and using homework exercises to 
support generalization and change.
Our results indicated that the reduction in paranoia was 
partially mediated by improvements in reasoning. The 
study was powered on ITT changes in the primary out-
come and in the reasoning biases and was consequently 
somewhat underpowered for the mediation analysis, but 
the pattern of results is consistent with one aspect of 
belief  flexibility (awareness of the PM) explaining a rea-
sonably substantial proportion of change in paranoia. In 
the more stringent, adjusted analyses, this finding fell just 
outside the conventional level of statistical significance. 
However, we conclude that this study provides reasonably 
convincing evidence of a mechanistic effect because: we 
deliberately used an intervention targeted at a putative 
mediator (reasoning processes), rather than the outcome 
(paranoid thoughts); and the mediator was identified by 
prior theory and with preliminary evidence that attri-
butes of reasoning predicted change in delusion.6,20,21 
Thus, a causal effect of state paranoia on belief  flexibility 
is unlikely.
Table 5. Statistical Moderation Analysis for Mediator 
(Reasoning) Outcomes at Post 2 Timepoint
Moderator
Mediator  
at Post 2
Interaction  
Effect SE P Value N
Digit span Number of 
beads 60/40
0.46 0.20 .022 93
Digit span PM (yes/no) 1.27 0.17 .073 92
Digit span  
forward
PM (yes/no) 1.58 0.34 .036 92
Digit span  
forward
Number of 
beads 60/40
0.86 0.31 .008 93
SANS PM% −2.64 1.30 .046 91
SANS PM (yes/no) 0.75 0.12 .070 92
Note: PM, possibility of being mistaken; SANS, Scale for the 
Assessment of Negative Symptoms.
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This study therefore supports the proposition that tar-
geting belief  flexibility may be an effective strategy for 
intervention with delusions. As well as a lack of flexibility 
in relation to their own delusions, people with delusions 
also display more general deficits in belief  flexibility and 
analytical reasoning.58–60 Training people to become more 
aware of and flexible in their general thinking style and 
to consider that they might be mistaken appears to lead 
to changes in appraisals of everyday experiences which 
trigger state paranoia. Moritz and colleagues,28 in their 
recent review, also emphasize the role of “sowing the 
seeds of doubt” and propose that MCT works through 
encouraging “patients to be less confident in their judg-
ments [our emphasis] and to seek more evidence when 
little information is available.”
The hypothesis that JTC is a mediator was, however, 
not supported, counter to expectation. Given that we did 
find an effect on JTC, but not as a mediator, it might be 
that learning the general skill of increasing data gather-
ing to support everyday decision making is not relevant 
to paranoia. In this study, a relatively low proportion of 
participants showed the JTC bias at baseline in the exper-
imental group (32%); therefore, we had unexpectedly lim-
ited power to investigate this hypothesis. We examined 
the data further to explore this. In the intervention group, 
those without the bias at both time points and also those 
who improved in data gathering, both showed reductions 
in paranoia, whereas those who continued to JTC at 
both time points did not change in paranoia. It therefore 
remains possible that JTC mediates changes in paranoia, 
but only in a subgroup. More studies are needed to clar-
ify the mechanistic role of JTC in delusion changes and 
prevalence of the JTC bias by delusion subtype.61
The effects of the intervention on reasoning were not 
moderated either by premorbid IQ by baseline reasoning 
biases. Whereas we previously found that those with more 
marked reasoning biases responded less well to the train-
ing,31 we have modified and extended the intervention. 
This appears to have succeeded in extending its effective-
ness to those with strong biases and those with a lower 
IQ. However, other variables do moderate the effects 
of the intervention on reasoning changes: people with 
better working memory and less in the way of negative 
symptoms responded better to the intervention. Future 
research should investigate further why the effects were 
apparent on digit span forward (the maximum length 
of numbers achieved), which reflects working memory 
capacity, rather than on digit span backward (the maxi-
mum length of numbers given in reverse), which addi-
tionally reflects the ability to manipulate items in working 
memory. “Type two” reasoning, which the intervention 
specifically aims to enhance, requires working memory 
capacity57 and thus our finding that this moderates out-
comes is consistent. Negative symptoms involve both 
motivational and cognitive capacities. It would be use-
ful to investigate how these different aspects of negative 
symptoms might contribute to the effects. We conclude 
that this therapy might be developed further to com-
pensate for both working memory deficits, and negative 
symptoms.
The study had a number of limitations. The measures 
of belief  flexibility employed related specifically to the 
main paranoid belief; future research could be improved 
by incorporating more general self-report and perfor-
mance assessments of belief  flexibility. Although there are 
some existing self-report scales assessing cognitive flex-
ibility and psychosis-related cognitive biases (eg, Dennis 
and Vander Wal62, Peters et al63), the relationship of such 
measures to delusional belief  flexibility has not yet been 
established, and further work is warranted to establish 
this. This may illuminate which components of belief  
flexibility are critical to paranoid thinking and provide 
the basis for investigating further the causal role of belief  
flexibility in paranoia. Secondly, we were also somewhat 
underpowered in relation to the mediation analysis, as 
discussed. The mediation analysis also assumes that there 
are no unmeasured confounders between the mediator 
and outcome, which is possible since both are measured 
postrandomization. We attempted to control for some 
confounders by including baseline measures as covariates 
in the mediation analysis; however, we cannot rule out the 
presence of further unmeasured confounders influencing 
the results. Thirdly, assessments of outcome were con-
ducted by independent assessors, but they were not blind 
to treatment condition. Finally, our primary outcome 
measure assessed current paranoid state, and although it 
incorporated a measure of conviction, the latter did not 
change significantly. The study was not test of a ther-
apy: it was designed as a proof-of-concept experiment, 
delivered by graduate researchers, not therapists, and the 
intervention was brief: nevertheless it had an effect size of 
-−0.36 on paranoia. Longer term, clinically important, 
and more wide-ranging benefits, including larger effects 
on delusional conviction, preoccupation, and distress, 
require a more intensive therapeutic intervention, with 
trained therapists. Taking account of the findings of the 
current study, we are currently extending the intervention 
as a course of 8 sessions, to incorporate a greater number 
and range of experiential, self-monitoring, and home-
work exercises, and piloting it, prior to testing in a RCT.
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